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Current
Signal Performance as of
Signal
Type |
Trade
Date |
Index |
Return
since issued |
|
|
|
Nasdaq 100 |
|
Russell 2000 |
|
S&P 500 |
|
Cumulative
Returns since First TimingCube
Live Signal () as of
Index |
Long
Only
|
Long
Only
with
Margin |
Long
& Short |
Long
& Short
with
Margin |
Buy
& Hold |
Nasdaq 100 |
|
|
|
|
|
Russell 2000 |
|
|
|
|
|
S&P 500 |
|
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|

Stocks moved
lower on the week despite the Federal Reserve's decision not
to raise rates for the first time in over two years. The announcement
had been widely anticipated, but markets sold off after the
accompanying Fed statement cited remaining inflation pressures
and left the door open for more rate hikes later this year.
With its decision to pause, the Fed acknowledged that the economy
is slowing. This could mean bad news for stocks in the second
half of the year as an economic slowdown coupled with inflation
would result in diminished corporate profits. As a matter of
fact, inflation fears resurfaced early in the week when oil
prices hit $77 a barrel after BP had to shut down an Alaskan
field that accounts for 8% of U.S. production. In such an environment,
it is not surprising that investors remain cautious. This is
illustrated by the sharp bearish reversal that stocks experienced
Wednesday. After an initial surge following a better-than-expected
report from Cisco Systems, markets reversed course to finish
lower on the day on higher volume.
For the week, the Nasdaq 100 and S&P 500
respectively lost 1.14% and 0.99%. The Russell 2000
fared worse, as it shed 3.17%. The Nasdaq 100 and Russell 2000
still rest below both their 50-day and 200-day exponential moving
averages (EMAs). For its part, the S&P 500 remains above its
50-day and 200-day EMAs. Our Cash
signal remains in effect.

Evolution
As promised when we implemented the current Cash
signal on July 14, 2006, the TimingCube
brain trust has been hard at work on adapting the Model to
market conditions which we had not experienced live or in
backtesting before. Today, we are happy to disclose the results
and accordingly, we will let the numbers speak for themselves
and keep the words to a minimum.
Before we get to the numbers, we need to set the framework within
which we always operate:
- Stay
true to our Trend Timing principles of delivering a 100%
mechanical system
- Focus
on mid-term trends for infrequent trading
- Not
engage in curve fitting or other tempering with historical
model behavior
- Insure
that enhancements improve the entire backtested period (the
only exception is the 15% Cash
signals which slightly decrease historical performance for
added downside protection)
We always
place honesty and transparency first, and accordingly, unlike
many of our less scrupulous competitors, we will not alter
or hide our live signal history. All the signals we issued
live will remain unchanged in the results we publish. However,
from now on, the backtesting that we are all interested in
is the one for the Current Model and accordingly, in the next
few days, we will switch the Results page
to reflect the updated Model. For posterity and all of us
who like to keep records, we provide a permanent copy of the
Original Model backtest.
For complete details of the backtesting of the Revised Model,
including all the signals and cumulative performance since
1989 see the "Nasdaq
100 Historical Performance with Revised Model". Our Model
is still primarily driven by the Nasdaq Composite index
but we used the Nasdaq 100
results to make comparisons with earlier published backtests
easier.
Rather than analyze the backtested trade history, most readers
will be satisfied with the resulting performance statistics
as presented in the table below.
Table 1: Comparative backtest performance statistics
since 1989
|
Original
Model |
Revised
Model |
Buy
& Hold |
 |
|
Annualized Performance
|
|
43.95% |
48.75% |
12.78% |
 |
|
Cumulative gain
|
|
61,067% |
108,993% |
724% |
|
Number of trades |
52 |
53 |
NA |
|
Number of Cash Signals |
1 |
7 |
NA |
| Average
Number of Trades/Year |
3 |
3 |
NA |
|
Number of winning Trades |
40 |
48 |
NA |
| Winning
Trades Ratio (without Cash
signals) |
76.5% |
89.1% |
NA |
|
Average Signal Duration |
124
days |
121
days |
NA |
| Shortest
Signal Duration |
3
days |
2
days |
NA |
| Longest
Signal Duration |
531
days |
531
days |
NA |
 |
|
Best gain on a single trade
|
|
For a Buy signal (Long) |
236.7% |
236.7% |
NA |
| For
a Sell signal (Short) |
36.7% |
30.8% |
NA |
 |
|
Average gain on a single trade
|
|
For a Buy signal (Long) |
24.8% |
30.9% |
NA |
| For
a Sell signal (Short) |
8.4% |
9.6% |
NA |
 |
|
Worst loss on a single trade
|
|
For a Buy signal (Long) |
-7.0% |
-4.3% |
NA |
| For
a Sell signal (Short) |
-4.7% |
-2.0% |
NA |
 |
|
Maximum equity drawdown
|
|
-22.8% |
-22.8% |
-83.0% |
-
The backtest period is from January 3, 1989 to July 14,
2006
- For the Original Model, trades since June 18, 2001 are
the live trades
- All figures are for the Nasdaq 100 index
- All TimingCube
Model figures are for a Long
and Short strategy |
Also
note that the backtest of the Original Model does not include
the 15% Cash signals
which were only introduced on March 12, 2004 (see "Drawdowns
and risk management" for backtesting we published then).
The most notable changes in the comparison is the increased
annualized performance which is directly attributed to a higher
Winning Trades Ratio and Average Trade Gain. The changes between
the Original Model and the Revised Model are very small in
nature, but large in how they deal with more recent markets.
Not surprisingly, the signals during the 1989 to 2001 period
have not changed very much (since this is the period our Original
system was developed on). Most of the enhancements have a
more significant impact on the more recent period. For example,
performance in recent years, e.g. since 2004, has drastically
increased to over 20% annualized as opposed to a slight loss
with the Original Model. This is on the Nasdaq 100 which has
been the worst index over the last few years. Other indices
such as the Russell 2000 and S&P 500 have substantially improved
as well. In fact, the Russell 2000 is up an impressive 22.9%
for 2006 year-to-date and 91.7% since 2004.
Another interesting statistic we have added is the "Maximum
equity drawdown" which incidentally has not changed
with the current Model. This represents the largest drop in
value from a high to a low, regardless of signal boundaries.
The largest such decline was -22.8% which happened between
May and June of 2001, which compares to the -17.2% we have
experienced over the last stretch of signals. So while double
digit drawdowns are not pleasant (especially for highly leveraged
investors) they are part and parcel of investing in the stock
market and should always be kept in perspective by keeping
in mind that first and foremost we are Trend Timers to avoid
the large losses which the markets deliver from time to time.
The backtest serves us well by highlighting the fact that
the maximum equity drawdown for Buy & Hold over the same period
is 83.0%, registered between March of 2000 and October 2002.

Question:
Does the Fed really set interest rates?
No. The Fed (short for Federal Reserve Board) does not really
set interest rates. It cannot dictate long-term interest rates
which are set mostly by market forces, but can at best temporarily
influence the direction of the changes.
The mechanics are as follows. In the U.S. interest rate decisions
are taken by the Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) as it
targets a desired interest rate (the Federal Funds rate which
currently remains at 5.25%). This is the guideline rate for
the shortest overnight loans between the Fed and financial institutions.
The way the Fed works to achieve the target rate is by engaging
in the open market for bonds and other debt securities. Through
agencies like the U.S. Treasury or private companies the Fed
can issue or purchase back IOUs, effectively injecting or withdrawing
liquidity from the system. The beauty is that the Fed also has
the option of simply creating the dollars it wants to inject
(what used to be known as "printing" in the old days).
So, for example, when the Fed wants to push rates down it can
buy back large sums of bonds from banks and other institutions.
Large sums in billions of dollars per day are routine. The banks
then have extra cash reserves which, unlike the IOU they sold
back to the Fed, are not earning interest and must be loaned
out as rapidly as possible. In a competitive market the way
to issue loans faster is by offering competitive rates, thus
the downward pressure the Fed intended to create. The rub is
that just because there are extra cash reserves available, does
not necessarily mean borrowers want it at the expected rate.
Warm
wishes and until next week.
The TimingCube
Staff
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Turbo Model
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Classic Model
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